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ABSTRACT 
As unique and sui generis organizations Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) are one of 
the most important key actors of modern democratic-political system. They must not be 
regarded simply as administrative or regularity-oriented extensions of the public man-
agement framework. If we don’t want “the democratic representativeness” to be re-
duced to “a dead point of an institutionalism”, we have to let “the political” reveal in 
all its robustness. The sheer “democratic modus vivendi” only goes with this sort of de-
constructivist and emancipatory state philosophy. Our claim is that without considering 
the spirit of “the political”, it is almost impossible to appreciate the sheer role and 
function of the SAIs in the modern democratic state system. An SAI appears just like a 
“vanishing mediator” in the political system. It institutionally serves for the figuration 
of the political and then it functionally vanishes away to give birth to the political. So 
what makes an SAI vital for the democracy is closely associated with the role of “van-
ishing mediator”. If an SAI is enabled to take part in the setup of political system with-
out any barrier and if its legislative reporting function is carried out through a deliber-
ative and open agenda, the critical role of the SAIs in remaking process of the political 
will eventually emerge. 
Keywords - Supreme Audit Institutions, Democracy, Public Management, Political, 
Politics, Performance Audit, Financial Audit, Compliance Audit, International 
Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to question the role and place of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(SAIs) in the public sector and to emphasize the inevitable political character of SAIs. 
There are different types of SAIs all over the world. Some SAIs have certain judicial 
powers while others merely enjoy specific administrative/legislative authorities. This 
practical division between the SAIs makes it somehow difficult to determine the ideal 
functional characteristics of SAIs in the public management system. It should be also 
noted that SAIs have contrasting mandates and work under different conditions. Due to 
the varied situations and structural arrangements of SAIs, not all theoretical descriptions 
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may apply to all aspects of their work. 
The main motivation of this paper is to highlight and question the political role of SAIs 
in modern democratic systems. The significance and noteworthiness of the topic seems 
relatively untouched as specific to the roles of SAIs in the relevant literature so that’s 
why we try to describe a more political and mediator figure of SAI beyond traditional 
and modern administrative aspects. In order to make a sound description of this sort, 
one must not limit oneself to the given terminology of administrative sciences and so he 
should also benefit as much from inter-disciplinary approaches. Both in traditional and 
modern descriptions of SAIs we face with a configuration of a public body mandated 
for certain constitutional missions either sketched out in a hierarchal or horizontal line 
of authority. By using a well-known terminological division between “the political” and 
“the politics” which essentially belongs to modern political philosophy, this paper in-
tends to better understand and evaluate the critical role of SAIs in today’s world. The 
suggestive claim and the synthesist approach of this study are unique and introduced for 
the first time in this paper.  
In our view, SAIs must not be regarded simply as administrative or regularity-oriented 
extensions of the public management framework. Apparently, one of the most important 
functions of SAIs is “reporting of the irregularities to the parliaments”. This reporting 
function cannot be underestimated but we should also consider that for the proper per-
formance of this function the SAIs have to emerge as political mediators beyond their 
traditional roles. If we focus on the democratic-political system in broad terms, we can 
easily see that SAIs do produce original outputs as soon as they are closely linked with 
the general political performance of the state apparatus. Here we assert that SAIs would 
mean nothing for the entire public system if they are not considered as certain “political 
mediators” serving for the political robustness of the general democratic system.  
By using the term “robustness” we don’t mean that of a functionalism within which 
every actor or institution has its own designated role or mission. The political (but not 
the politics) is explicitly incompatible with any type of functionalist state legitimization 
and far away from the functionalist perspective, the political in the Arendtian (1958) 
sense, tends to produce irregular, unexpected and creative outcomes. In this respect, the 
political is not something to establish the essential parameters of an ideal consensual 
position but rather it is the common ground for the production of the main principles of 
an ideal agonistic discursive symbiosis. 
This paper is derived from an overall review of the research literature on public finan-
cial accountability, SAIs and political sciences. A formal literature review accompanies 
this paper and provides specific referencing to the underlying literature as well. Through 
this paper we explore the following key questions. What does the division of political 
and politics imply for the functioning of SAIs? What can be the political implications of 
the roles of SAIs in a set of articulative agonistic democracy? Do the main forces of 
modern democratic state originally pose an administrative or institutional functionality? 
Does a political description of an SAI have the potential for rethinking a public body as 
surpassing the institutional limits of modern democratic principle of separation of pow-
ers? How should we understand the new stress on SAIs to contribute to the democratic 
consciousness of citizens as described in the newly introduced high level documents of 
International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI Framework)? Which type 
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For a well-grounded interpretation of a “political” SAI we mainly move on the analyti-
cal and critical review of ISSAI Framework which is introduced by INTOSAI (The In-
ternational Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions). This framework extensively 
presents an ideal/formal definition of SAIs and related audit techniques. SAIs all over 
the world are expected to comply with the relevant requirements of ISSAIs both on in-
stitutional and audit level. While it is a common fact that not all SAIs in the world ex-
hibit a remarkable compliance with the INTOSAI standards we think that this frame-
work is a good indicator and starting point for the critique of an un-political SAI. With-
in the scope of this study, we especially draw on the significance of the new missions of 
SAIs recently incorporated in the framework. In fact it is clearly seen that recent inter-
national audit standards (ISSAIs) attribute a more active role to the SAIs. In this con-
text, besides being an organization leading by example, SAIs are also expected to be 
active mediators which improve the overall democratic consciousness and therefore 
create a visible difference to the lives of citizens. We claim that this active role can be 
fully realised only by acknowledging the political character of SAIs. If an SAI is ena-
bled to take part in the setup of political system without any barrier and if its legislative 
reporting function is carried out through a deliberative and open agenda, the critical role 
of the SAIs in remaking process of the political will eventually emerge.  
POLITICAL VERSUS POLITICS 
Bureaucratic organizations are expected to be “politically neutral” simply because polit-
ical affiliation and interference refer to implicit dependence or biased views in today’s 
world. We see that the bureaucratic domain and the political domain are stringently sep-
arated from each other in modern democracies. Of course we have an exact reason for 
this distinction: To make sure the state operates neutrally in a fairly secular environ-
ment, modern democratic state philosophy stipulates that the policy making procedures 
should be reserved only to the discretion of politicians themselves. Partly because of 
this dichotomist conception, the political/ politics (together with the daily exhaustive 
implications of the term) gained always an unfavourable image in modern societies. 
Many people adopted this sort of “restricted and corruptive political understanding” and 
consequently they found politics and politicians highly unreliable and misleading. In 
contrast to this dichotomist conception we claim that the true political phenomenon 
cannot be attributed solely either to politics or to bureaucracy itself. That’s to say, “the 
political” circulates at fairly all domains of social life and it cannot be abandoned to the 
mercy of politicians. In the agonistic sense, we can also say that the life itself is thor-
oughly patterned by “the political” and the shadow of the political can be traced at every 
aspect of socio-political existence. 
As “the political” permeates everywhere and its existence is ineradicable, we have to 
acknowledge that some organizations in the public domain emerge as directly political 
while some others function politically. So we can differentiate certain public organisa-
tions from one other by using the terms “institutionally political” and “functionally po-
litical”. It is evident that the SAIs are not institutionally political organizations and they 
are not expected to be either. The relevant INTOSAI (International Organization of Su-
preme Audit Institutions) standard ISSAI 11 underlines this fact poignantly;  
Except when specifically required to do so by legislation, SAIs do not audit 
government or public entities policy but restrict themselves to the audit of policy 
implementation” (INTOSAI  ISSAI 11, 2007:5). On the other hand ISSAI 30 al-
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so reminds us the significance of the “political neutrality” of SAIs and the audi-
tors. According to the standard, “it is important to maintain both the actual and 
perceived political neutrality of the SAI. Therefore, it is important that auditors 
maintain their independence from political influence in order to discharge their 
audit responsibilities in an impartial way. This is relevant for auditors since SAIs 
work closely with the legislative authorities, the executive or other government 
entity empowered by law to consider the SAI’s reports (INTOSAI ISSAI 30, 
1998:5). 
In the above lines we can see a very restricted conception of policy-making procedure 
or politics. Just because, it merely implies a very technical and instrumental grasp of 
“the political”. If we paraphrase this approach we eventually come up with something 
like: “policy is up to the politicians and the implementation of the policies is up to the 
techno-bureaucratic organisations.” In opposition to this restricted “political” concep-
tion, we suggest that depending on the critical legislative linkage in the performance of 
the audits, SAIs have to be considered as “functionally political organizations.” It 
should be also noted that SAIs are functionally political organisations by their nature. If 
the imminent political implications were to be fully removed from the overall perfor-
mance of SAIs, we would obtain nothing but secondary executive techno-bureaucratic 
extensions ready to carry out what they are commanded. The published reports, the 
briefings or the press conferences of SAIs in front of the parliament and media are in-
spiring and revealing just because the critical statements released thereof have explicit 
or implicit political implications.  
The division between “political” and “politics” introduced by Chantal Mouffe is quite 
illustrative with respect to understanding the conceptions referred here.
1
 By “the politi-
cal” Mouffe means the dimension of antagonism which is constitutive of human socie-
ties and by “the politics” she means the set of practices and institutions through which 
an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality pro-
vided by the political (Mouffe 2005:9). A similar approach can be seen in Sheldon 
Wolin who makes a significant distinction between “politics” and “political”. According 
to Wolin, politics refers to the legitimized and public contestation, primarily by orga-
nized and unequal social powers, over access to the resources available to the public 
authorities of the collectivity. “Politics is continuous, ceaseless, and endless. In contrast, 
the political is episodic, rare” (Wolin 1996:31). 
In this study, moving from the above mentioned theoretical division between the two 
terms -political and politics- we call the sheer originative/agonistic nature of in-between 
human relations as “political” and in contrast to this, the given institutional settlement 
of the social praxis is called as “politics”. In this context, “political” is defined as an 
expression of the perpetual reconstructive nature of social domain and so as an expres-
sion of the impossibility of social essence, while “politics” is just implied for the institu-
tional formation of a given state apparatus. As a result of this understanding, we assert 
that the democracy should not be considered as an “institutional formation” or a “gov-
ernmental regime” to emerge once and for all, but rather a political process the paradox-
es of which can never be removed. 
We can also affiliate this understanding with the Derridian notion of “democracy to 
come” (Derrida 1994:81).  For Derrida, because of the deconstructive moment of unde-
cidability democracy never comes, but it manifests its sheer existence by always “being 
on the way to come”. Viewed from this perspective, we can derive that politics and de-
Murat İnce 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 16, Iss. 2, 2015 
 www.ipmr.net  63 IPMR
mocracy are not a form of governance but are a form of subjection and the illusory con-
sensus setting the social is nothing more than a fugitive and contingent moment which 
is predestined to be “destructed” by a new articulation or apparatus. So, in a sheer de-
mocracy the setting priority of the political in fact refers to this assertion; the institu-
tive/legal moment and the emancipation moment are by no means identical and includ-
ing democracy there is no any political framework or form of relation to guarantee this 
identicalness.  
Therefore the originality of the democracy rests on its deep relation with the political. If 
we want a sheer democracy which is always coordinated on the way “to come”, we 
must not ignore its sheer relationship with “the political” and we should also be highly 
alert against its potential reductions to politics. The question here is to determine the 
exact affiliation of SAIs. Which domain, political or politics, do SAIs originally affiliate 
with? It should be admitted that an SAI which is functioning within the traditional 
“politics” domain is less likely to add value to the democratic consciousness of the soci-
ety. So it must be considered that a fair and proper functioning of an SAI is possible 
only through a sheer acknowledgement and performance of SAIs as political mediators.  
THE PLACE OF AN SAI IN THE DEMOCRATIC-POLITICAL SYSTEM 
In most countries SAIs were originally created for the assessment of significant irregu-
larities in the public finance management system and the subsequent reporting of them 
to the parliaments. In fact, what makes an SAI original for the entire public management 
system is its reporting responsibility in the name of Parliament. It is not unjust to infer 
that an SAI which is solely mandated for “reporting to the executive power” is hardly 
separate from the executive bodies. So the sheer political feature of an SAI emerges 
where and when it has a direct or indirect affiliation with the legislative power. This is 
because legislation is the most significant force of modern democratic state where the 
heart of the political steadily and strongly beats. 
As is known, one of the fundamental principles of modern democratic state is “the prin-
ciple of separation of powers.” In fact this principle constitutes the functionalist opera-
tive framework of the modern state. According to this principle, the political power is 
enjoyed by three separate/relatively independent forces; execution, legislation and the 
judiciary. None of these forces are allowed to interfere with each other’s affairs and 
each is expected to operate within its own domain as well. The main merit of “the sepa-
ration of powers” is that it hinders the centralization of power at certain hands and by 
doing so the naked, unfavourable and the coercive pervasion of the political power are 
considerably eliminated. In this perspective, good governance arises from a dynamic 
equilibrium between the various powers of -and increasingly beyond- the state 
(Braithwaite, 1997:321-330; Fisher, 2004: 506-507). The remedy against an overbear-
ing or improper government is the organization of institutional countervailing powers. 
So in this context, an independent SAI has the critical potential to act as such, comple-
mentary to the voter, parliament, and political watchdogs. That’s why an SAI is given 
the power to request that account be rendered over particular forms or aspects of execu-
tive behaviour (Bovens and others, 2008:231-232). However, we should not ignore the 
basic fact that the power itself, by which I mean the operating hegemonic spirit which 
essentially constitutes the state (whether modern or pre-modern), is over there and al-
ways at work. That’s to say, even in the most idealistic operational existence of separa-
tion of powers, we face with “the fact of power” ineradicably. So one must not forget 
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that, even in the most democratic environment, legislation, execution and the judiciary 
will continue to be the manifestations of political power. Consequently, as democratic 
citizens, our goal must not be to eliminate the unfavourable manifestations of power 
from the state apparatus (no doubt that we should not hesitate to orient ourselves to that 
“dead end” although it seems deadly unachievable), but rather we should focus on in-
creasing our political consciousness which is expected to emerge out of the acknowl-
edgement of the unavoidable reality of the power itself. 
Do the main forces of modern democratic state originally pose an administrative or in-
stitutional functionality? In our view, contrarily, we had better not consider the case in 
this sense, otherwise one day we would feel obliged to confess that “the democracy has 
come”. If we equalize the institutional moment with the democratic moment, we would 
easily proclaim the glorious arrival of the democracy one day. But surely it will not be 
that “democracy”, because the political all along deconstructs the given setting and the 
so-called eternal consciousness thereof. So we must again emphasise that the modern 
forces of the state, that’s to say execution, legislation and the judiciary, should be con-
sidered as the manifestations of the political. If we don’t want “the democratic repre-
sentativeness” to be reduced to “a dead point of an institutionalism”, we have to let “the 
political” reveal in all its robustness. The sheer “democratic modus vivendi” only goes 
with this sort of de-constructivist and emancipatory state philosophy. 
It seems it is relatively easy to position one public organization’s place in the modern 
democratic state which is constituted on the basis of the principle of separation of pow-
ers. We could assume that one organization has to belong either to execution, either to 
legislation or to the judiciary. However there is one single institution that crosses the 
defined separations and poses somehow an intersectional political standpoint; that is 
those “SAIs” who have the mandate of auditing on behalf of parliaments. So indeed, 
SAIs carry out multiple and concurrent missions in the modern state particularly in 
terms of the functionalism of separation of powers. For example, we observe that espe-
cially the court-model SAIs enjoy three different involvements.
2
 This sort of SAIs can 
be labelled as “semi-judiciary” and “semi-administrative” organizations which have the 
authority of reporting directly to the parliaments. On one hand, as bureaucratic organi-
zations, they appear in “the execution”, on the other hand, as judicial organizations, they 
belong to the judiciary power. And yet their reporting responsibility on behalf of the 
parliament makes them a strong agent of legislation. In fact the public financial ac-
countability is a triangular arrangement involving the executive arm of government, the 
parliament and the SAI (Hedger and Blick, 2008:4; Portal, 2013: 211-214). We must 
admit that there is no any other organization apart from the SAIs which has this sort of 
triple intersecting role in the modern democratic state. 
Moreover, SAIs are sui generis organizations in that one can hardly determine the exact 
role of an SAI within the framework of separation of powers. The strong stress on the 
independence of SAIs is a good indicator of this striking fact as well. Similar to the ju-
diciary power or in practice similar to the courts delivering judgements on behalf of the 
nation, SAIs in many countries are furnished with a very powerful and unquestionable 
independence. The second major document of ISSAI framework
3
, ISSAI 10, which is 
also known as Mexico Declaration, features this fact effectively and establishes the 
main independence criteria for the SAIs all over the world. As it is put in the Declara-
tion, the state institutions cannot be absolutely independent, so SAIs should have the 
functional and organizational independence required to carry out their mandate. The 
document also underlines the crucial fact that “Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) can 
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accomplish their tasks only if they are independent of the audited entity and are protect-
ed against outside influence” (INTOSAI ISSAI 10, 2007:1). We claim that this constit-
uent characteristic of the independence is very much in line with the performance of the 
political. SAIs almost spontaneously function as political mediators as long as their in-
dependence is maintained and safeguarded on constitutional level. If the democracies 
were not in need of sheer political mediators to such an extent, the independence of cer-
tain state organizations other than the state itself would not have been so highly 
stressed. 
Going back to our definition of political, we will easily recall that the core feature of 
“the political” is its cross-bordering emancipatory gesture. Within the dialectical reso-
nance of the state apparatus, the institutional moment is fully surpassed by the emanci-
patory gesture of the political. In other words, the political gives life to the democracy 
only through this de-constructivist (de-institutionalizing) reorganization of the state 
forces. We could see the sheer political character of an SAI best in this cross-bordering 
multiple functionalism. Here, an SAI appears just like a “vanishing mediator” in the 
political system. It institutionally serves for the figuration of the political and then it 
functionally vanishes away to give birth to the political. So what makes an SAI vital for 
the democracy is closely associated with its role of “vanishing mediator”.
4
 With this 
outstanding appearance, SAIs permanently mediate in the political system just like the 
Derridian specter (1994) haunting the decisive/constructive moment. However, if we 
don’t properly acknowledge this political character of SAIs, we are unable to appreciate 
the exhilarative singularity embedded in the overall functioning of SAIs. 
NEW ROLES OF SAIS 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) are national agencies mainly responsible for auditing 
government income and expenditures.  Their legal mandate, reporting responsibilities, 
and effectiveness vary in accordance with nation-state concepts and current government 
policies. They have certain traditional roles to act as watchdogs over the management of 
public funds as well as the quality and credibility of reported government financial in-
formation.  In many countries the SAI audits all public sector organisations while some 
other countries have a separate, specialised organisation to audit government business 
enterprises and other autonomous or politically sensitive public organisations.  
The growing complexity of the types of problems and demands that confront govern-
ments, along with the expanding range of approaches being used to respond to those 
issues have triggered the need for a global public sector management revolution. Citizen 
demands are now forcing governments to be more transparent and citizen focused 
(Nino, 2010; Gaventa, 2002; Florini, 1999:15). The global financial crisis has put also 
an added premium on government efficiency and cost cutting. Especially SAIs’ role in 
curbing corruption became relevant (Dye and Stapenhurst, 1998; Dye, 2007:303-307). 
Doubtlessly, audits are potent deterrents to combat against waste and abuse of public 
funds.  They help reinforce the legal, financial, and institutional framework which, 
when weak, allows corruption to flourish, and they also establish a predictable frame-
work of government behaviour by reducing arbitrariness in the application of rules and 
laws. 
As a result of the developments mentioned above, SAIs are now being considered as 
effective actors to improve trust of citizens, promote good governance, and fight against 
SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTIONS: A VANISHING MEDIATOR FOR DEMOCRACY? 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 16, Iss. 2, 2015 
 www.ipmr.net  66 IPMR
corruption. Resolution of the UN General Assembly on SAI Independence for the De-
velopment of Transparency, Accountability and Efficiency in the Public Sector high-
lights this fact stimulatingly and recognizes the important role of supreme audit institu-
tions in promoting the efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and transparency of pub-
lic administration (UN Resolution A/66/209, 2011; Moser, 2013). 
Although the new roles of SAIs in public finance management system are becoming 
crucial, the given description of an SAI in the ISSAI framework presents a relatively 
formal and un-political point of view. Hence, the independence and political neutrality 
of SAIs are highly stressed in the main documents of ISSAI framework. In line with this 
understanding, the framework requires the SAI to be an autonomous body that has its 
funding guaranteed and is free from executive interference. It is considered that the 
guaranteed independence of the SAI is critical for its reports and opinions to be credi-
ble. We see that the new missions of SAIs are adequately incorporated especially in the 
newly introduced document of ISSAI framework; ISSAI 12 “The Value and Benefits of 
Supreme Audit Institutions – making a difference to the lives of citizens.” However, we 
believe that the philosophy of an active SAI as introduced in ISSAI 12 has some contra-
dictions with the idea of an independent, autonomous and politically neutral SAI as in-
troduced in the previous documents of ISSAI framework. 
Lima Declaration (ISSAI 1), which stands for the Constitution of the INTOSAI stand-
ards, emphasises one pivotal point that “the audit is not an end in itself but an indispen-
sable part of a regulatory system” (INTOSAI ISSAI 1, 1977:1). Beyond any question, 
audit is carried out for certain goals; among these goals, the ultimate aim of “improving 
the consciousness of accountability” probably comes the first. Moving from the general 
description of the audit in Lima Declaration, we can derive primarily four functions of 
audit. Accordingly, audit is done with the aims of revealing deviations from accepted 
standards and violations, achieving efficiency, effectiveness and economy in the finan-
cial management, making it possible to take corrective actions in individual cases and 
finally making those accountable accept their responsibility through preventing the vio-
lations of the laws and regulations. 
The aims of the audit mentioned above exhibit mainly traditional functions of the SAIs 
in all over the world. Any SAI carries out most of these functions and almost all the 
auditors are very familiar with these professional goals as well. Nevertheless, we ob-
serve that recent INTOSAI standards attribute a more active and assertive role to the 
SAIs (Azuma, 2003:86-87; 2008:96; INTOSAI-Donor Secretariat (IDI), 2013; Richter, 
2013:5; Nagy, 2015:218).). Especially after the introduction of the audit standard ISSAI 
12 in 2013, SAIs are now considered to be key and leading actors in the public man-
agement system as a whole, far beyond their traditional roles and responsibilities. 
Interestingly, ISSAI 12 takes “public sector auditing” as an important factor in making a 
difference to the lives of citizens. Within the concept of the standard; an independent, 
effective and credible SAI is regarded as an essential component in a democratic system 
where accountability, transparency and integrity are indispensable parts of a stable de-
mocracy. The standard underlines this significance with the following sentences: 
In a democracy, structures are created and elected representatives are empow-
ered to implement the will of the people and act on their behalf through legisla-
tive and executive bodies. A risk to be considered with public sector institu-
tions in a democracy is that power and resources can be mismanaged or mis-
used, leading to an erosion of trust that can undermine the essence of the dem-
Murat İnce 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 16, Iss. 2, 2015 
 www.ipmr.net  67 IPMR
ocratic system. It is therefore critical that the citizens of a country are able to 
hold their representatives accountable. Democratically elected representatives 
can only be held accountable if they, in turn, can hold accountable those who 
implement their decisions. Consistent with the spirit of the Lima Declaration an 
important component of the accountability cycle is an independent, effective 
and credible SAI to scrutinise the stewardship and use of public resources (IN-
TOSAI ISSAI 12, 2013:4). 
In line with the philosophy introduced above and seeking the ultimate aim “SAIs mak-
ing a difference to the lives of citizens”, ISSAI 12 attributes three new challenging mis-
sions to the SAIs. “1-Strengthening the accountability, transparency and integrity of 
government and public sector entities; 2- Demonstrating ongoing relevance to citizens, 
Parliament and other stakeholders; and 3- Being a model organisation through leading 
by example” (INTOSAI ISSAI 12, 2013:5). 
To our view, these new missions of SAIs are highly compatible with the “raison d'être” 
of the public sector auditing and they can be fully materialised as long as the political 
spirit of the SAIs is surely admitted. These missions cannot be carried out by a tradi-
tional techno-bureaucratic organization because they, before all else, require an institu-
tion to be more active, creative, challenging and leading; in short it requires an institu-
tion to be “political”. Our assertion is that even if an SAI functions within its traditional 
setting, it poses and requires a political performance by its nature, let alone the new 
democratic missions expected to be performed by SAIs. So we should admit that the 
innovative standards as ISSAI 12 are, in essence, expecting even more “political” SAIs 
which are already “political by nature”. 
WHAT DO AUDIT METHODOLOGIES IMPLY FOR THE DEMOCRATIC-
POLITICAL SYSTEM? 
SAIs apply certain audit techniques and the detailed theoretical information with regard 
to these techniques are systematically described in the ISSAI framework. Our main fo-
cus is not to elaborate on and challenge the audit standards set forth in the ISSAI 
framework in general, but we want to bring forward some critical points or defaults 
faced in the implementation of public sector audit standards. To our view, the given 
definitions and the descriptions of the audit techniques laid down in the ISSAI frame-
work are not competent enough to address the new missions and roles expected from 
the SAIs. 
ISSAI framework mainly describes three types of audit; financial audit, compliance 
audit and performance audit. According to the framework, the purpose of financial audit 
is to enhance the degree of confidence of intended users in the financial statements. This 
confidence is achieved through the expression of an opinion by the auditor as to wheth-
er the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
applicable financial reporting framework (INTOSAI ISSAI 200, 2013:4).  
Financial audit standards compose the big portion of ISSAI framework (INTOSAI IS-
SAI 1000-2999, 2010). They originally come from the International Standards on Au-
diting (ISAs) introduced by International Federation of Accountants (IFAC ISAs, 
2010). INTOSAI directly adopted the ISAs in 2010 and by adding a Practice Note to 
each document the ISAs became public sector financial auditing standards. As it is seen, 
the current financial audit standards mainly figure and represent the experience of pri-
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vate sector auditing. However, the purposes and scopes of public sector auditing and 
private sector auditing are quite different from each other. Although it is not discussed 
aloud, many SAIs are facing with serious problems in the adoption and implementation 
of private sector audit methodology nowadays. Actually, the private sector financial 
audit methodology includes a very static and opinion-focused perspective and it hardly 
complies with the philosophy of public sector auditing. The core aim of the financial 
audit is to produce a final opinion for the relevant parties such as stakeholders, inves-
tors, creditors or debtors. However this sort of opinion is not relevant and meaningful 
for the public sector as expected because, far from reaching an opinion, the audit results 
in the public sector mainly provide guidance for the betterment of the public accounts 
and generally focus on the enhancement of the public accountability. 
On the other hand, the ISSAI framework defines the compliance audit “as the independ-
ent assessment of whether a given subject matter is in compliance with applicable au-
thorities identified as criteria.” Accordingly, compliance audits are carried out by as-
sessing whether activities, financial transactions and information comply, in all material 
respects, with the authorities which govern the audited entity (INTOSAI ISSAI 400, 
2013:3). Here we see that the compliance audit is identified as very similar to a financial 
audit and the methodology of financial audit is fully copied in the implementation of 
compliance audits. Many SAIs also confront with challenging problems in the imple-
mentation of relevant compliance audit standards (INTOSAI ISSAI 4000, 4100 and 
4200, 2010). Before all, the definition and the description of the compliance audit in the 
ISSAI framework do not represent the broad experiences and varied audit techniques of 
SAIs all over the world. It should not be also forgotten that many compliance audit 
tasks are carried out with comprehensive/holistic purposes and these purposes cannot be 
simply covered by a methodology which is likely to lead its intended users to consume 
the “final opinion” at the very earliest.  
The ISSAI framework defines performance auditing as “an independent, objective and 
reliable examination of whether government undertakings, systems, operations, pro-
grammes, activities or organisations are operating in accordance with the principles of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness and whether there is room for improvement” 
(INTOSAI ISSAI 300, 2013:2). According to the framework “the main objective of 
performance auditing is constructively to promote economical, effective and efficient 
governance. It also contributes to accountability and transparency” (INTOSAI ISSAI 
300, 2013:3). We observe that of all the audit standards in the ISSAI framework, per-
formance audit standards (INTOSAI ISSAI 3000-3999, 2010) best suit the ideal role 
and performance of SAIs described in the framework. One crucial reason is that these 
standards originally come from the SAIs’ audit experiences. That’s to say, they are de-
rived directly from the field. We can say that the theoretical formulation and the practi-
cal perfection of the performance audits are widely developed within the scope of public 
sector auditing. Although this is the fact, partially along with the instant introduction of 
financial audit standards in the public sector auditing (I mean the recent adoption of 
IFAC standards), the performance audit methodology relatively lost its popularity and 
as a result many SAIs began to feel forced to implement primarily financial audit tech-
niques in their audit tasks. Behind this tendency, doubtlessly, we find late financial 
capitalism’s eventual goal to design the public finance management systems of develop-
ing countries in great harmony and make them audited with standardized techniques 
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With their current structure performance audit standards need further improvement as 
well. To our view, this audit methodology should be reformulated and defined as the 
unique audit approach for the entire public sector auditing. In fact, performance audit is 
the most suitable audit approach which can be conducted highly compatible with the 
political spirit of SAIs described above. As it is expected, the audit philosophy cannot 
be reduced into an assessment of irregularities, nor should it be conceived as a negative 
act. Because the modern objective of accountability is not only to identify inefficiency 
but to establish the causes and to provide recommendations on how it may be reduced. 
Acceptance and implementation of those recommendations is a critical goal to provide 
progressive and systematic improvement in public-sector performance over time. Audit 
is not a substitute for the emphasis on individual wrong-doing but is complementary 
(McGee, 2002: 10; Bourn, 2007: 67-107; Premchand, 1999: 46). If an audit approach 
limits itself only with the detection of irregularities and does not indicate any develop-
mental capability, it eventually reduces itself into a non-creative institutional technique. 
However, performance audit differs essentially from the other audit approaches in that it 
offers solutions, highlights the progressive points and yet develops concrete recommen-
dations for the enhancement of public management system (Raaum and Morgan, 2001; 
Waring and Morgan, 2007: 323-326). 
A similar point was remarkably highlighted by one of Ex-Assistant Comptroller General 
of the USA in 1976. In his addressing to the Annual Governmental Seminar in Mis-
souri, Ellsworth H. Morse points out that “all auditing can be called performance audit-
ing, irrespective of labels which are often attached in an effort to draw distinctions be-
tween audits of differing activities or with differing objectives” (Morse, 1976:1). And in 
challenging the limits of financial audit methodology Morse asserts that the language 
public accountants and auditors use to state their opinions on financial statements is so 
elevated, abstract, and standardized as to be largely incomprehensible to the unsophisti-
cated and not really of much help to others. Consequently according to him, “auditing 
has to be conceived, managed and regarded as a constructive component of overall 
management, rather than a negative and critical function that acts more as a barrier to 
efficient and effective operations than as an essential method of promoting improve-
ments” (Morse, 1976:3). 
If we are to claim that “beyond being a profession, audit is an art itself” we have to fo-
cus on the creative implications and performative phenomenology of the auditing act. 
This performativity, we suggest, is highly consistent with the Arendtian political spirit. 
Far from being a regular administrative requirement, the notion of “promoting im-
provements” uttered by Morse is the common ultimate goal of performativity and the 
political. In line with these arguments, we believe that by acting as political mediators 
the SAIs can really inspirit the democracies only through a comprehensive definition 
and implementation of performance auditing. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
Inspired by the theoretical division between the two terms -political and politics- which 
is specifically introduced by the representatives of agonistic politics, we call the sheer 
originative/agonistic nature of in-between human relations as “political” and in contrast, 
the given institutional settlement of the social praxis is named as “politics”. In this con-
text, “the political” is defined as an expression of perpetual reconstructive nature of so-
cial domain and so as an expression of the impossibility of social essence, and yet “poli-
tics” is just implied for the institutional formation of a given state apparatus. As a result 
of this approach, we assert that the democracy should not be considered as an “institu-
tional formation” or a “governmental regime” to emerge once and for all, but rather a 
political process the paradoxes of which can never be removed. 
If we don’t want “the democratic representativeness” to be reduced to “a dead point of 
an institutionalism”, we have to let “the political” reveal in its all robustness. The sheer 
“democratic modus vivendi” only goes with this sort of de-constructivist and emancipa-
tory state philosophy. In a sheer democracy the setting priority of “the political” in fact 
refers to this assertion; the institutive/legal moment and the emancipation moment are 
by no means identical and including democracy there is no any political framework or 
form of relation to guarantee this identicalness. We therefore argue that as unique and 
sui generis organizations SAIs are one of the most important key actors of modern 
democratic-political system, reminding us the fact of non-identicalness and yet “the 
political”. Therefore, SAIs must not be regarded simply as administrative or regularity-
oriented extensions of the public management framework. Without considering the spir-
it of “the political”, it is almost impossible to appreciate the sheer role and function of 
the SAIs in the modern democratic state system.  
Although we have various types of SAIs all over the world, we observe that, as a com-
mon characteristic of almost all the SAIs, “the legislative reporting mission” of an SAI 
plays very critical role in the real performance of democracies. Many SAIs are mandat-
ed for “reporting of the irregularities to the parliaments” within the concept of regularity 
audits or attestation engagements. This reporting function cannot be underestimated but 
our assertion is that for the proper performance of this function the SAIs have to emerge 
as “political mediators” beyond their traditional roles. If we focus on the democratic-
political system in broad terms, we can easily see that SAIs do produce original outputs 
as soon as they are closely linked with the general political performance of the state 
apparatus. Here we assert that SAIs would mean nothing for the entire public system if 
they are not considered as certain “political mediators” serving for the political robust-
ness of the general democratic system. 
SAIs are original organizations in terms of the functionalism of separation of powers as 
well. It seems it is relatively easy to position one public organization’s place in the 
modern democratic state which is constituted on the basis of the principle of separation 
of powers. We could assume that one organization has to belong either to execution, 
either to legislation or to the judiciary. However there is one single institution that 
crosses the defined separations and poses somehow an intersectional political stand-
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point; that is “SAI” which has the mandate of auditing on behalf of parliaments. 
Bearing in mind that “the political” is essentially defined by the cross-bordering eman-
cipatory gesture of the political, one can hardly dismiss the critical fact that the true per-
formance of the SAIs poses nothing less than the sheer political presence. Within the 
dialectical resonance of the state apparatus, the institutional moment is fully surpassed 
by the emancipatory gesture of the political. In other words, the political gives life to the 
democracy only through this de-constructivist (de-institutionalizing) reorganization of 
the state forces. We could see the sheer political character of an SAI best in this cross-
bordering multiple functionalism. Here, an SAI appears just like a “vanishing mediator” 
in the political system. It institutionally serves for the figuration of the political and then 
it functionally vanishes away to give birth to the political. So what makes an SAI vital 
for the democracy is closely associated with the role of “vanishing mediator”. With this 
outstanding appearance, SAIs permanently mediate in the political system just like the 
Derridian specter haunting the decisive/constructive moment. The hot button is that if 
we don’t properly acknowledge this political character of SAIs, we would never appre-
ciate the exhilarative singularity embedded in the overall functioning of SAIs. 
NOTES 
1. Here I am fully inspired by the agonistic politics’ conception of “the political”. Ag-
onistic politics can be shortly defined as “a defense of political against politics. For 
agonists the political is an expression of impossibility of an eventual “essence” in 
social domain and eventual “seamlessness” of the society composed of ineradicable 
antagonisms. The society has no any sutured pattern because the social itself does 
not have any essence. The overlooking of the political comes with the reduction of 
the social into factitious “essences” and the loss of agonistic vividness. In fact the 
rejection of the political never hinders its fierce return. As an expression of the re-
jection of the political the falsity of the essentialism is hidden in the phrase that this 
essentialism attributes a factitious “identicalness” or “completeness” to the contin-
gency and seamlessness which are deeply embedded within the individual and social 
identity. For a critical analysis of modern agonistic politics see “A Critique of Ago-
nistic Politics” (Ince, 2016:1-17). 
2. There are mainly three different types of supreme audit institutions in the world. 
Many countries use one of three auditing systems: Napoleonic, Westminster, or 
board. In the “Napoleonic system” the supreme audit institution -also called the cour 
des comptes (court of accounts)- has both judicial and administrative authority and 
is independent of the legislative and executive branches. The institution is an inte-
gral part of the judiciary, making judgments on government compliance with laws 
and regulations as well as ensuring that public funds are well spent. This model is 
used in the Latin countries of Europe (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and others), 
Turkey, and most Latin American and francophone African countries. In the 
“Westminster system”, used in many Commonwealth countries, the office of the au-
ditor general is an independent body that reports to parliament. Made up of profes-
sional auditors and technical experts, the office submits periodic reports on the fi-
nancial statements and operations of government entities -but with less emphasis on 
legal compliance than in the Napoleonic system. The office serves no judicial func-
tion but, when warranted, its findings may be passed to legal authorities for further 
action. And finally the “board system”, prevalent in Asia, is similar to the Westmin-
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ster model in that it is independent of the executive and helps parliament perform 
oversight. Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, for example, have an audit 
board composed of an audit commission (the decision-making body) and a general 
executive bureau (the executive organ). The president of the board is the de facto 
auditor general (World Bank, 2001:1-2). 
3. INTOSAI’s Framework of Professional Standards consists of four levels. Level 1 
contains the framework’s founding principles. Level 2 (ISSAIs 10-99) sets out pre-
requisites for the proper functioning and professional conduct of SAIs in terms of 
organizational considerations that include independence, transparency and account-
ability, ethics and quality control, which are relevant for all SAI audits. Levels 3 and 
4 address the conduct of individual audits and include generally-recognized profes-
sional principles that underpin the effective and independent auditing of public-
sector entities (INTOSAI ISSAI 100, 2013:1). 
4. Vanishing mediator is a concept that exists to mediate between two opposing ideas, 
as a transition occurs between them. At the point where one idea has been replaced 
by the other, and the concept is no longer required, the mediator vanishes. In terms 
of Hegelian dialectics the conflict between the theoretical abstraction and its empiri-
cal negation (through trial and error) is resolved by a concretion of the two ideas, 
representing a theoretical abstraction taking into account the previous contradiction, 
whereupon the mediator vanishes. In terms of psychoanalytic theory, when someone 
is caught in a dilemma, they experience “hysteria”. A conceptual deadlock exists un-
til the resulting hysteria breakdown precipitates some kind of resolution; therefore 
the hysteria is a vanishing mediator in this case. In terms of political history, the 
term refers to social movements, which operate in a particular way to influence poli-
tics, until they either are forgotten or change their purpose. The term was first intro-
duced by Fredric Jameson in a critical essay (Jameson, 1973: 52-89) and Alain 
Badiou used a similar, but more explicitly post-structuralist term “vanishing term” 
in “Theory of the Subject” (Badiou, 2009). This concept has also been adopted by 
Žižek in “For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political factor” 
(Žižek, 2002), where he used it in a political sense, similar to Marx's Analysis of 
Revolution. 
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